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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
.STATE . OF

UTAH

EX

REL

GROVER A. GILES, ATTORNEY
GEKER.A.L FOR STATE Q:F UTA.H,
Plajnti.ff,
'

T. E. BURKE,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
ST_A_TEM.ENT
This action is in quo 'varranto by petition or complaint filed in this Court by the State on relation
of the attorney p-Pneral seeking to vacate the office
of Justice of thr PearP of the Fourth Pre-cinet of
~fagna~ 1Jtah held by the defendant, T. E. Burke,
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convicted of a felony, and to require him to surrender the office.
The facts are undisputed. The defendant was electt3d to the office November 8, 1938, duly quaJitied to
hold the office January 2, 1~39, and ever since di8- j~
(jharged the duties of the office, and was and still ~
is in possession of the office. May 14, 1940 an in- . .
forn1ation, under
·
'
,::(
Title 103, Chapter 25, Section 1, R. S. L.
1933,
'vas filed in the district court in and for Salt Lake
County, charging the defendant with the crime or
offenRe of g'antbling - a felony under the statute.
On trial, he on .A.pril 8, 1941 'vas found guilty and on
April 12, 1941 was by the district court s~utenced
to an indeterminate tenn in the State prison ot

1

-utah.
From that judgment the defendant prosecuted a
proper appeal to this Court. .April 14, 1940 a certificate of probable cause "'as granted by the district court, and pending the appeal, he was released
fron1 custody on his own reeo~1iznnce, and at no
time under the judgment 'vas confined or imprisoned, or otherwise restrained of his liberty. That
case on appeal is still pending in this Court.
To the petition filed by the attorney general the
defendant interposed a demurrer and motion to
strike, as more particularly ·appears on the record
and files in the cause. The attorney .general, to
support his petition ,or eom,plaint, pre-pared and
served a brief. V ariouR grounds are urged by him
in support thereof. It is ~ot urged or claimed that
the commission of the offense of "Thieh the defendant ,~.,-.as eonvicted and sentenced, '\\ras connected
with or r~el·ated to or grew out of the office held by
the defendant, or was committed in the perform·
ance of duties with respeet thereto.
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ARGUMENT

~

POINT I.

~-~~ The first point made by him is 'vith respect to
--.

Section 103-1-35, R. S. 1933.

The section is as follows :
~·A

sentence of imprisonment in the State
prison for any term less than for life suspends all civil rights of the person so sentenced during such imprisonment, and forfeits all private trusts and all public offices, authority or po'\\rer.''
Considerable space is devoted by eounst:l in his brief
as to the meaning of the 'vords ''conviction'' and
·'sentence.'' That the defendant in the criminal
case \vas "convicted'' and \ras "sentenced" to the
~tate prison, may readily he eonceded. If not so,
the appeal of the defendant \vould be wholly fruitless. "\Ve thus need not devote any consideration to
that part of the brief. But let it be conceded that
the real point made by counsel under that statute
li~s deeper. 'Vhat counsel more particularly urges
is that because of the language, ''A sentence of inlprisonment in the State prison,'' etc., a forfeiture
of the office held by the defendant by operation of
law and as a necessary ~onsequence resulted immediately upon th~ eon·viction and sentence of the
defendant of the charged felony in the criminal case,
and that the appeal taken by him did not avoid the
hnmediate effect of such result.
Counsel cites many cases whieh he claims support
f.:uch view. On an examination of the cases so
cited, it will be fonnd that thP '~eciRions in each and
all of them 'vere rendererl under constitutional or
Rtntntory provjsions materially different fron1 the
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Utah ~tatute referred to, in that the constitution or
.statute of such ~tates provided that a public office
held by an incumbent became vacant or was fur~
J G~tted merely upon "·a conviction of the incumbent
of a felony." We submit the Utah statute 1s.not to
the effect that a public office of an incumbent is
\Tae;ated or for1e1ted. on a "Inere convicti,on" of a
felony, but that under the Utah statute to 1orteit a
public office held by an incumbent requires not
only a oonvictton and a sentence of irnpr1~onn1ent
in the State prison, hut also an imprisonment
a.s well. To say that the Utah statute n1eans no
more than the statutes of other sta.tes providing. that
a mere conviction of a felony by an incu1nbent in
office vaeates and forfeits the office, is to ignore
and not to give effeet to n1urh lang·uage contained
in the Utah statute. If the legislature intended that
a mere conviction of a felony forfeited all private
rrusts and all public office held by an incumbent,
the le.gtj_slature would have sajd so. It did not do
that. Thus the numerous cases cited on the subject
by counsel for the State are not app1icai:J1e.
This brings us to a further consideration or i11terpretation, or more particularly, the application of
the Utah statute itself. We do not find, nor does
the State cite, any case from this jurisdiction conHtruiug or applying the statute. In co1n~tdering it.
let it not be confused 'vith Chapter 7, 105-7-13,
rel·ating to removal of offieers hv judicial prqceedings, and 'vhere it is expressly provided that "upon
a conviction" of remova.I, the court "must pronounce judgment that the defendant he re1noved
from office,;' and while there is p·rovided that an
appeal may he taken from the judgment of removal,
vet it further is there expressly provided that ''until such judgment is reversed the defendant shall ~le
suspended from his office,'' and ''pending- the
appeal, the .offire muRt he filled as in case of a
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vacancy.'' There are several cases from this jurisdiction involving the application of the removal
statute, notably the cases of
Parker v. Morgan, 48 Utah 408; 160 Pac.
764.
Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 596.
lt is readily seen that by the ren1:oval statute, a
''mere conviction'' directly and expressly ''ousted
the defendant from office'' until the judgment of
removal was reversed, and that pending~ the appeal,
the office 'vas to be filled a~ in case of vacancy. But
the removal statute and the statute under consideration, 103-1-35, are in no sense analogous.
Should it be argued that the phrase or language of
the statute, ''a sentence of imprisonment in the
State prison,''. is broader and more comprehensive
than the language in other States providing that a
''mere conviction" of a felony vacated the office
of an incumbent and forfeited all rights to the office,
or that the word ''sentencen necessai.:ilY implies a
conviction, we say such language or phrase nevertheless must be considered in connef~tion \vith the
further language o.f- the section, ''during sue-h imprisoninent, '' language not found in statutes of
other States under which the decisions in the cited
caseR 'vere rendered. The language or phrase,
''during such imprisonment,'' must be given due
effect in considering and construing the section in
question. It ma.y not be ignored, as is done by
counsel for the State. We regard it a material
factor in considering and construing the s-ection in
question.
1t iR claimed our sta.tute is the same as the Cali . .
fornia. statute. 'rhe statute as it appears in the
R.evised Statutes of Utah, 1933, is the same as contained in
ron1piled Laws of Utah, 1917, Sec. 8fl:t;_
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There the California statute is noted, as ''Cal. Pen.
(j.• ,. Sec. 673, \' but let it .be observed that a star i~
placerl after the figuves 673, indicating that tho
California statute is different from the Utah statute, or that the Utah statute is not like the California statute. And so it is not, for the California
statute uses the phrase "conviction of a fel,ony,"
and on1its the words '.'during such imprisoilment."
N eve.rt~eles.s counsel for the State cites and says

that the case of
~IeKannay v. llortorn, 151 Cal. 711; 91 Pac.

598,
is on all fours with the case in· hand. \Ve dispute
that. In the California case, the charter of the consolidated city and county of San Francisco pro.
vided that
''an office becomes vacant 'vhen the incumbent thereof dies, resig·ns, is adjudged
insane, convicted of a felony, or of an
offense involvjng a. violation of his official dutirs." (Italics added).
The Court stated that the political code of California was the same. Eugene Schmitz) 'vhile 1nayor
of the city of San Francisco, '' "ras found guilty of
a felony - the crime of extortion- by the verdict
.:of a jury,'' and was sentenced by the court to a. term
·of imp~risonment for five years in the Sta.te prison
·of Califiornia. A copy of the judgment and of the
proceedings was transmitted to the hoard of superiVisors of the city, which declared a vacancy in the
office and appointed Ed"rard Taylor as may;or .
•John Boyle was secretarv to Schmitz at the time of
.and pri~r and subs:eqt~ent to· the conviction of
Schmitz, and Harry McKannay \Vas appointed sec
reta.ry for T·aylor. 1\fcKanna:v. as clerk, presented
a. claim tjo· Samuel Horton, auditor of San FranSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

cisco, for salary due him. At the sante tin1e, Boyle
presented a claim for salary due him for and dur..
ing the same period. The auditor, because of uncertainty as to which of the clain1ants was entitled
to the salary, refused to pay either. n!cKannay
thereupon brought manda.mus against flortou, the
audit.or, requiring him to pay the salary to Me..
l(annay. The alternative 'vrit granted \'fas 1nad~
permanent. The decision, of course, involved the
question as to whether Schmitz or Taylor constituted the rightful incwubent to the office of mayor.
1'he effect of the decision was that Taylor and not
Schmitz, durin.g the period in question, was tho
rightful incumbent to the office. Schmitz thereupon appealed front the judgment o.f the Superior
Court to the district court of appeals and in doing
~o was granted a certificate of probable cause b;y
the Superior Court but 'vas not admitted to hail
pending the appeal.
'Ve think there are several distinct and different
factors in the eases. As is seen under the Califoriiia statute, the office ipso facto became vacant
when an incumbent was convicted of a f·elony. But
that, we submit, is not the legal effect of the Utah
statute "'hen a11 its parts are considered togr~ther,
as they must be.
In the next place~ under thP California criminal pro ..
cedure, an appeal by the defendant, though "rith a
certificate of probable cause; but without being admitted to bail, does not rele·ase the defendant from
nhysir.·al restraint and he is required to be kept in
custody by the sheriff. The California. statute~
Penal Code, (Cal.), Sec. 1244,
!n ~ncb particular~ i~ set forth in the opinion of the
MrKa.nnay ~ase.
Schmitz, notwithstanding his
appPal, was thus phy~ically reRtrained by the sherSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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iff and was by him confined and held in custody in
.the county jail, pendin~ the appeal. \Vith respect
thereto, the Court. in the l\ic Kannay case said:
'

'

'' \\trhether a felony does or does no.t involve
a violation of . official duty, the indi~t
nlent \Vill eharge the factH conHtituting the
felony, and a verdict of guilty 'vill impart
a sentence of in1prisonment in tltc ·state
prison, to be £xecuted at once, unless a stay
of proceeding:s pendingo an appeal is obtained through the n1edium of. a eertift·
cate of probabte cause; and even iu tha~
c::1.se, the defendant i ~ committP.tl to clilse
custody in the county jail to a\vait the re~ult of his appeal, unless the court,, in the
exerci ~e of a discretion rarely exercised
and only in exceptional cases, adntits him
to bail. The r€sult is that a public officer
convicted for a felony is placed by the verdict in a position and under a physir.al restraint which preventR him from performing the duties of his office.''
In that connection, the Court further said that:
'" SjncP a pri~oner in close custody cannot
~dn1iniF-ter :1. public office, he cannot be
allo,ved to stand in the way of the appointment of one who can perfonn its duties.~,

Though it be as.sumed tha.t the court here ·was not
in duty bound to admit the defendant to bail, still it
cannot he g.ainsaid that the court had the power,
jn the exercise. of its discretion, to do so.
Section 105-44-5, R. S. 1933,
of the code· of criminal procedure, provides that
after conviction of an offense not punishable with
death, a defendant may be admitted- to bail as a
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matter of right when the a.ppeal is from a. judgment imposing a fine only, and ''as a matter of discretion in all other cases.'' Let it be conceded tha.t
when an incumbent. of a public Qffice is _physically
1·estrained and actually confined in jail, that during
~uch confinement or imprisornn1ent he necessarily
is unable to and cannot perform the duties of the
office, and hence it is necessary that another be
appointed to do so.
·
J3ut no""' let the lTtah sta.t.nt.e 1·Pla.ting to an appeal

in a criminal case be considered. It is Section
105-40-9. The heading is ''Effect of Appeal by
Defendant.'' It provides that:
\n appeal to the Supre-me Court from a
judgment or convict~on stays the executiOll of the judg1nent upon the filing 'vith
''

4

the clerk of the oourt in 'vhich the conviction "'"a.s had of a certificate of the judge
of such court or of a juRtice of the Supreme Court that jn his op1n1on th<~re is
probable cause for the appeal; but not
otherwise.''
This statute when complied w·ith, as here it is, is a
fundamental right of every defendant in a crimina.! case and grants a s,tay of exe·_-·ution of the judgment pending the apv~eal, whether the offense is a
rnere mu;;demeanor or a felony when the penalty is
1
not death. '' hy under thP statute should a different rule he applied, when the defendant is an incumbent in public office 'vhen the ronuniss.ion of
tl1~ offens~ in no parti(.';ula.r relates to or is connected with or g-ro"..s out of the charg-ed offense
anrl when eommjtterl by a d~fendant 11ot in pnhlic
office? The stat11te it~~lf m·flk€l·s no such d~s.1inction.
lt is vain to point to the remov~1 sta.blte of nnhlic
nffirPrR "rl1Prfl on eonvict.ion nnd a jn11.~mf\r't of re1
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1noval a Rtay of execution of the judg~nent pending
the appeal is expressly denied. We assert there is
no statute which directly or expressly denies a stay
of execution of the judgment on appeal from a conviction and sentence of gambling. No such statute
is pointed to by the State, except 103-1-35, but that
statut~ does not say that no stay un appeal shall he
granted an incumbent in public office convicted and
sentenced for the commission of a felony.
Such statute and the statute under which the defendant was convicted and sentenced are in no
sense in pari materia. Each relates to a distinct,
separate and different subj9ct, and may not be read
together to ascertain the legal effect of either.
/jounsel n1ay say they do not contend that the statutes are in pari n1ateria.; but the propo~:;ition advanced by them means just that. Of course, all defendants whether in public office or not 'vhen finally adjudged guilty of the commission of a felony
forfeit all right to public office and private trusts;
and when so finally determined the defendant is an
Jncumbent in public office, be, of course, Inust
vaca.te the same and surrender it up. But the question here is, must he do so pend~ng an appeal timely and properly taken to a proper court and beforr.
the judgment appealed from is affirmed!
It certainly seems a harsh rule, mthout direct or
express legislative decree, that an incu1nbent in public office convicted of a felony in no 'vi~e relating
1o or connecte-d with or growing out of his office
and senteneed to imp·risonment, may not on a
proper appeal have the execution of the judgment
s.tayed to test the validity of the proceedings resulting in his conviction no rna tter how grievous and
prejudicial errors during tl1P trial of his convic·
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tion may have been OOinmitted or ho" scant or insufficient the evidence against hhn ma.y be. ·

If it be the sense of the legislature to decree that
an incumbent in public office convicted of a felony,
whether related to his office or not and sentenced
to imprisonn1ent in the State prison may not, notwithstanding an appeal taken by him fron1 the judgment; have a Rtay of execution of the judgment,
pending the appeal, then let the legislature, by son1e
direct and approp1iate language, say so, and not
leave the matter open to suspend or modify a stay
of execution under the general a.ppealing statute
to meet exig·encie-s of a particular case.
Counsel may say they do not dispute that an appeal
taken as here stays ''the execution: -of the judg1l1ent ·' appealed from. They must· say it, -¥rhether
thr~. . do so or not. In portions of _their brief they
in effect say that ·a forfeiture of the office is no
part of the judgment, that the forfeiture is a mere
consf'quence or result of the judgment. We recognize some such loose language i~ used in some of
the cited decisions involvin.g- constitutional or statutory nrovisions different from ours. But when
npplied to our statute, there is no logic in surh
statement. If the ''execution of a. iudgn1ent'' is
~tayed, of necessity all result~ and !lon~equences
thPrPof nre ::ll~o ~tnved. If the judgment here
annealed from i~ ~ffirmed, all of its consequences
and results go with it. If the judgment i~ re,..
yP.rsed, ag·a.in all ih~ consequences and, results go
with the revers·al. Tn other words. in either ca.se,
tllfll ta.il a.nd hair p-o "vifh thP hjflp. 'rl1e anneRl here
i~ from the convictio11 Rnd ~PntP:nre ~~ prononnced
hv the court in thP rrin1inal !l.a.RP. The Rf'ntP.nce as
so prornonnePcl (lf)l1Rtit11tP~ fhp iuil_gmpnt ::.nnea}Pil
from. And if thnt. i~ a.ffirmed. Rll i ~ affirm PO· if
rPVPrsPd, all i~ rPYPrRed. Su~h reRult rna~~ not he
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avoided, except to say that the appeal here did not
"~tay the execution of the judgment." That we
say, cannot be maintained without porinting to some
express 'statute, as in case of the removal statute
directly and expressly staying execution of th~
judgment pending the appeal.

POINT II.
The State further contends that the offense of

gambling or operating a gambling place, under
'fitle 103, Chapter 25, Section 1, constituted "misconduct in office.'' To su·ppo.rt that, counsel particularly cite
Section 103-1-17, R. S. 1933.
The section is headed '' Felonious Miscond-uct iti
Office Forfeits Office and Disqualifies.'' (Italics
added). The section its·elf rea~s:
''The conviction of any State, county, city,
to,vn or precinct officer of a felony i'l'~vvlv
ing rnisconduct in office, involves as a consequence in addition to the punishment pre~cribPd by la.". , a forfeiture of his office,
and disqualifies him ever afterwards from
holding any public office in this State.''
(Italics added).
~As herein frequently stated, we aga.in remind the
Court that it is not claimed that the felony of
gambling or of operating a gambling place of which
the defendant was convicted was in no 'vise related
to or connected with or grew out of the defendant's
office, or th·a t the commission of the felony resulted from any duties p,erformed by the defendant rejating to his office. It thus is difficult to see how
the charged felony in any way ''involved miscon·
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.. ,

duct ill office.'' Certainly it is not every felony an
incun1bent may co1nmit which may be regarded nusconduct in office. In the ~lcKannay case heretofore cited, it is recognized that •·there are f elon.ies
which involve no violation of official duty.'' It is
apparent that must be so. The long· quot~ltion from
46 C. J. 987 cited by counsel as to \Yhat constitutes
nlisoonduct in office, in the \vindup it 1s expressly
stated that the acts must be such ''as to runount to
maladministration in office.'' A nu1nber ·of cases
are cited by counsel wherein it is claimed that the
operation of_ a gambling house and its inevitable
inducement to gamble or the permitting of gambling
by a public officer is misconduct in office.. But the
cases cited do not support the proposition so broadly stated. In the cited case of Etzler v. Bro"\\-rn, 58
Fla. 221; 50 So. 416, it was found that a city councilman violated his public obligation by selling his
off'icial influence or ·vote to influence the city
council. Such, the Court said, constituted misconduct in office. There the committed act related to
the office held by the incumbent.
The case of In re Carpenter, 50 N. Y. S. R. 631;
21 N. Y. S. 351, involved the removal from office of
a justice of the peace, mainly on the ground that
he used his office to punish a constable u;ho was
a:lleged to have shot another, 'lohich alle.rJalion the
justice knew 1l'as false; W'"hich 'Ye-re acts done in pursuance of and in conrse of official conduct.

In the two l\fissouri cases cited, the defendants re1noved failed or 11 r.o! Pr'ffd f o pe r{or1n d·uties connected 'vith their office.
But the main case as to thi~ point cited and relied
on hy the State i~ thP c::tse of
State v. Fratrr, 198
a.sh. 675; 89 Par..
(2rl) 1046.

'T
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It is well particularly to notice this case. The defendant there was mayor of the city of Bremerton.
He, with another, was charged with the crime of
conspiracy to establish and operate in the city
gambling games, games of chance, gambling devices and to sell lottery tickets. The defendant was
convicted. There too after conviction quo warranto
proceedings were brought to re1nove the rnayor
from office. With resp~ect thereto the Supreme
Court said:
I

''The relator contends that his conviction
of the crime of conspiracy to violate the
gambling la·w·s of this State does not constitute malfeasance in office in that the
crime of \vhich he was convicted did not
affect the performance on h1s part of the
duties of mayor. He cites State ex rel.
Martin v. Burnquist, 141 ~[inn. 308, 170
N. \V. 201, 609; I\1echem on Public OfficerB, 2!JO, Par. 457, and Throop on Public
Officers, 363, Par. 367, and other eases of
like import~ all of which support the follo,ring rule announced in . the last mentioned authorit-y: '"\Vhere the constitution
or a statute authorizes a removal for official misconduct, or misfeasance!, miscondurt, or maladministration in office, or
siini.lar 8(~tR of nuRbehavior in office, the
genera.] rule is, that the officer can be l'Pmoved only f.or acts or omissions relating
to tl1e performance of his official duties,
not for those which affpct his ~eneral
moral character,. or his conduct as a ma.n of
business, apart fron1 his eonduct as an officer. In such a case, as a learned judge has
remarked, it 1s neee~ssary to separate the
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character of the n1an fron1 the character of
the officer'.''
The Court admitted the f1}rce of, and approved, the
rule contained in the citations, nevertheless held
that the defendant Frater was guilty of misconduct in office, for the reason that under the statute
(citing it) he as mayor u'as the superintendent of
the department of public safety and was the· official
head of the city gove~rn·ment; tha.t it was his official
and sworn duty to compel obedience to ·the ordinances of the city and the statutes of the State; that
when he conspired to introduce gambling in the city
he violated the pr-incipal 1.and most important duty
of the office to which he ha·d been elected, and ftor
that reason, his conviction was held malfeasance in
office. The conditions or circumstances under which
it thus was held that th~ defendant Frater was
~JUilty of misconduct in office are here not pres.ent.
The defendant Burke wa.s not, as there, charged
'vith the superintendency ''of the department of
public safety'' or a.s the ''official head of the city
government,'' or as the head oflthe county gov-ernment. In the Frater case, it further 'viii be noted
that the defendant there 'vas also by information in
the criminal case charged with a cons-piracy ente~red
into by him and ~1nothPr to persuadP, and prornises
made of a monetary re,vard~ to induce the prosecuting attorney, ''in his official caparitv not to enforce
the gamblin~ laws of the State of Washington with
respect to the ~ames and devices to be ;operated by
the defendant Frater and another.'' No such conifitjon or eircumstHnCt? is here present~ and hence,
the Frater cas·e in essentials 'va~ different from
the Burke case.
Thr broad e01ntention ma.de here by thP State is,
that beenn~e thP defendant Burke in the r.riminal
rnsr "ras '' ronvirted of a felony and sentenced to
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imprisonment in the State prison,'' he ipso facto
forfeited all rights to the office of justice of the
p·eace :and ipso facto W:as removed from his office, but
refusing to do so the State found it necessary to
bring an independent action, or p·roceeding in quo
warranto to accomplish such removal.

POINT III.
(Page 18 of Counsel's Brief).

'rhere they say that ''the legislature has provided
~hat an ap.peal from a judgment of ouster i92 quo
11Ja'rranto proceedings should not stay the execution
of judgment of ouster,'' and particularly refer to
Section 104-41-17. The sect~on there provides
that:
'' '\1lere the defendant is adjudged g·uilty
of usurping, intruding into, or unla\vfully
holding public office, civil or n1ilitary, within this State, the exooutjon of the judgment shall not be stayed hy an appeal."
Wh·at that section has to do with the case in hand

is difficult to perceive. The section, as will h<'
noted, is under Chapter 41 relating to appeals under
the Code of C·ivil Procedure from final judgn1ents
in la.w and equity cases. The section has nothing
whatever to do with a.ppe·als under the code of
. oriminal procedure and as provided by Section
105-40-9. Nor does the eode of civil procedure in
any respect or in any particular restrict or n1odify
appeals under the code of criminal procedure.
lienee, the provisions of fhe one may not be rea(l
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into the other. They both are separate and distinct from each other.
ln the next place, the defendant here, on any proceeding brought for that purpose has not yet been
'~adjudged guilty of usurping, intru{lii1g

into or unlawfully holding public office,
civil or military, within the State.''
Had here a proper action in the district court in
quo warranto proceedi.ngs or otherwise been
brought to remove the defendant Burke from office
and ·a. judgment therein rendered decreeing that the
defendant had usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held a public office, towit, the office of justice
of the peace, a civil action, as admitted by the
State, let it be conceded no stay of judgment on
:1ppeal to the Supreme Oourt could under Section
104-41-17 be had. But,that is not this case.
The question here presented before this Court is
V{hether the complaint or petition of the State in
relation o.f the attorney gteneral states sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action in quo warranto at the time of the filing of the petition to
justify a remo'val of the defendant from the office
of justice of the peace. That is the question to be
determined and decided on the defendant's demurrer and motion to strike the complaint or petition filed in this C~ourt, and not the question as to
·whether a defendant in a civil or quo warranto pro~eeding, adjudged guilty of usurping or unlawfully
holding a public office, ha.s or has nJot, p~ending an
appeal from the judgment, the right to a stay of
the execution of the judgment. Let the case before
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the Court
the Court.
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decided and not another, not before

We thus submit this action for removal is preJnature and not maintainab~e until the appeal in the
criminal action is dispos,ed of and then only on an
affirmance of the judgment in that case.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLARD HANSON,
STEWART M. HANSON,
Attorneys for Defendant
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